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Abstract
In the battle of narratives to give meaning to the international system in the twenty-first century, emerging powers are ac-
tively engaged. In particular, the BRICS group, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, have advanced their
claim to reconstitute international affairs to make it more just and fair. What if their narratives about the international
system effectively contest narratives constituting the Liberal World Order? For understanding the battle more profoundly,
this study examines the strategic narratives of the BRICS. A documentary methodology was employed to elicit themes and
narratives in BRICS joint communiqués of 2009 to 2016 for the identification of its strategic narratives. I have identified
a system narrative of global recovery, an identity narrative of inclusive participation and an issue narrative of infrastruc-
tural development. A narrative grammar was used to relate BRICS strategic narratives with their narrative environment of
symbolic, institutional and material practices. Due to a partial compliance with the narrative grammatical rules, the BRICS
group may not effectively influence and gain public support.
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1. Introduction
In the battle of narratives to give meaning to the in-
ternational system in the twenty-first century, emerg-
ing powers are actively engaged (see the work of Cox,
2012; Hurrell, 2013; Ikenberry, 2011). What happens
when 42% of the world population effectively contest
existing narratives about the international order? As
Schweller commented: “Profound dislocations through-
out the global system are causing the narrative of world
politics to become an increasingly fragmented and dis-
jointed story” (Schweller, 2014, p. 9). The first decade
demonstrated stunning economic growth figures in the
BRICS countries, a group comprising of Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa. These emerging powers
were artificially grouped together in a famous Goldman
Sachs working paper (O’Neill, 2001; see also Wilson &
Purushothaman, 2003). The original BRIC acronym, with-
out the “S” of South Africa, signified four large emerging
market economies that had the potential to outperform
the G7 countries (O’Neill, 2001). These emerging pow-
ers took major roles in the global economy, and were
indispensable in the negotiation of development issues
(exemplified in the Heiligendam Summit in 2007; see
Cooper & Thakur, 2013, p. 269). The global financial cri-
sis of 2008 and its ramifications internationally perpet-
uated discontent with asymmetric globalization. During
the first BRICS Ministerial Meeting in 2006 encouraged
by the Russian Presidency, the four Foreign Ministers ex-
pressed their interests in a new consultation platform
(Kirton, 2015). The dialogue propelled various ministe-
rial meetings and the first BRIC Summit with heads of
states in 2009 in Yekaterinburg, Russia (BRIC, 2009). The
group advocated for reform ofmultilateral institutions to
correspond to the economic changes of the twenty-first
century (BRIC, 2009). In 2011, they enlarged its member-
ship to South Africa (BRICS, 2011). Originally a platform
on finance and good governance, the group broadened
its commitments throughout the years (see for example,
Larionova, Kirton, Bracht,Wang, & Rakhmangulov, 2016).
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A much-debated question is whether this political for-
mation makes sense, given the fast social, political and
economic differences between the BRICS countries (de
Coning, Mandrup, & Odgaard, 2014; Mielniczuk, 2013;
Thakur, 2014). In the global reordering of international
affairs (see the work of Xing & Shaw, 2014), the BRICS
mission is to promote a “multipolar, equitable and demo-
cratic world order” (BRIC, 2010, nº. 2). The formation
of strong strategic narratives may shape expectations
and beliefs positively, when the unstable and uncertain
situation perpetuated by the economic downturn and
the political crises in several of the BRICS countries are
taken into account (see the fall of emerging powers, in
Kiely, 2016). Recognizing BRICS continuous efforts to pur-
sue cooperation, it is important to analyze how the for-
mation of their public narrative make ontological sense
(Somers, 1994).
The BRICS joint communiqués that are released af-
ter each annual summit capture the group’s main as-
pirations and objectives. The communiqués stipulate a
strategic script as they are “designed or nurtured with
the intention of structuring the responses of others to
developing events” (Freedman, 2006, p. 22). A strate-
gic script, or in other words strategic narratives, are
“representations of a sequence of events and identities,
a communicative tool through which political actors—
usually elites—attempt to give determined meaning to
past, present, and future in order to achieve political ob-
jectives” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle, 2013, p. 5).
Using a constructivist approach, it examines how rational
actors construct a social, political reality (Wendt, 1994,
1999). There are three types of strategic narratives: sys-
tem narratives which “are about the nature of the struc-
ture of international affairs”; identity narratives which
“are about the identities of actors in international affairs
that are in a process of constant negotiation and contes-
tation”; and issue narratives which are “strategic in the
sense of seeking to shape the terrain on which policy
discussions take place” (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 7).
This study is situated in the “narrative turn” in interna-
tional relations (Roberts, 2006), in observation of liter-
ary studies (see the work of Barthes, 1966; Bruner, 1991;
Burke, 1962; Propp, 1968; White, 1980). Using the theo-
retical framework of strategic narratives, the study sets
out how the BRICS group gives meaning to the interna-
tional system, their collective identity and the issue area
of infrastructural development. The issue narrative of
infrastructural development is significant for that it de-
scribes the design and implementation of ports, roads,
airports, bridges, dams through “soft” technology trans-
fer and knowledge exchange and “hard” project develop-
ment, while emphasizing the sustainability element. As
Schweller writes: “emerging multipolarity is attributed
to the diffusion of economic, scientific, and technologi-
cal power” (Schweller, 2014, p. 85).
For the critical analysis, I analyzed how BRICS strate-
gic narratives complied to the “narrative grammar” for
that full compliance would “influence the success and
impact of a strategic narrative” (Dimitriu & de Graaf,
2016, p. 7). The narrative grammar rules draw atten-
tion to “connecting (however unstable) parts to a con-
structed configuration or a social network of relation-
ships (however incoherent or unrealizable) composed of
symbolic, institutional, and material practices” (Somers,
1994, p. 616, italics in original). Effective compliance of
these narrative grammatical rules enhances public sup-
port for BRICS mission. Strong strategic narratives have
the potential to empower political actors. I examine four
elements that relate to the narrative environment: mis-
sion purpose, legitimacy, the prospect of success, and
the presence of counter narratives. A compellingmission
purpose keeps “the focus on long-term, overarching pur-
poses and ambitions”; legitimacy concerns both the “ob-
jective sense (judicial, procedural) and a subjective sense
(political, public, ethical); the prospect of success “trig-
gers public support for a mission” due to “an overarch-
ing storyline”; and the presence of counter narratives
is a result of disagreement among political elites that is
reflected in mainstream media reporting on the issues
at stake (Dimitriu & de Graaf, 2016, p. 7). The authors
define a fifth indicator, which concerns the compliance
of a narrative into an “overall strategic communication
plan” (Dimitriu & de Graaf, 2016, p. 7). I have chosen not
to use this indicator for the analysis, because the BRICS
group has not collectively formulated a strategic commu-
nication plan. Using a soft power perspective (which ev-
idently is not so “soft”, see Mattern, 2005; building on
the work of Nye, 1990), BRICS joint communiqués aim to
shape the behavior of international and domestic audi-
ences and is therefore essentially strategic. These four el-
ements provide the tools to discusswhether BRICS strate-
gic narratives can influence and generate public support.
This paper analyzes first how the strategic narratives
of the BRICS give meaning to the international system,
their collective identity and the issue of infrastructural
development. And second, it examines how the BRICS
strategic narratives relate to a narrative environment of
symbolic, institutional andmaterial practices. Public sup-
port for the BRICS group is expected to decrease, due to
partial compliance with the narrative grammatical rules.
2. Qualitative Research Design
This study pursued a qualitative research methodology
guiding the narrative inquiry, confirming the observation
that: “Researchers will mixmethods together in different
ways, and we expect to see in the next decade a series of
patchwork, adaptive, broader methodologies” (Miskim-
mon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle, 2017, p. 24). This case study
about the BRICS group uses the theoretical framework of
strategic narratives to examine how their political com-
munication is persuasive. I have pursued a qualitative re-
search process, i.e. a documentary methodology, to un-
derstand how a credible storyworld is evoked in BRICS
joint communiqués. Documents can be used to reconsti-
tute the meaning of international affairs, “so as to de-
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velop and underpin particular visions of the world and
the things and events within that world” (Prior, 2011,
p. 67). The data set for this paper comprise of the BRICS
joint communiqués from2009 to 2016. Pursuing a theory
driven analysis, the results created “more a detailed anal-
ysis of some aspect of the data” (Braun & Clark, 2006, p.
84). It discusses the ontological features of BRICS strate-
gic narratives; it does not analyze the causal impact of
BRICS strategic narratives and the actual increase or de-
crease of public support. Thus, I have taken interpretivist
ontology to learn how meaning is generated within the
documents (Grix, 2002, p. 178). Table 1 sets out the qual-
itative research design for this study.
Reading addressed both the explicit, communica-
tive meaning and the implicit, conjunctive meaning in
the documents (Bohnsack, 2013, p. 225; Feldmand &
Almquist, 2012). Documents convey political interests as
they are “created for a particular purpose, crafted ac-
cording to social convention to serve a function of sorts”
(Coffey, 2013, p. 369). The textual reading of BRICS joint
communiqués was structured in six phases (see Table 2).
After the first two phases in which I organized the
documents and designed a coding framework, I situated
the narrative components of the BRICS story in phase 3
using Kenneth Burke’s framework of dramatism (Burke,
1962). Accordingly, “language is best seen as an enact-
ment, as a symbolic selection of circumference, which
gives entities an identifiable character (or substance)”
(Crable, 2000, p. 329). The who, when and where, what,
how and why questions contextualized the actions and
motives for BRICS cooperation. Phase 4 and 5 went
deeper into BRICS political communication by employing
a narrative and thematic analysis for the analysis of mu-
tual constituting aspects of content and form (narrative).
Accordingly, the “paradigmatic type uses an analytic pro-
cess that identifies aspects of the data as instances of cat-
egories; the narrative type uses an analytic process that
produces storied accounts” (Polkinghorne, 1995, p. 21).
Thematic and narrative structural analyses complement
each other, because they both “lend themselves to con-
structionist paradigms that view experiences, meanings
and social structures as mutually constitutive” (Shukla,
Wilson, & Boddy, 2014, p. 3). The identified themes are
“not necessarily dependent on quantifiable measures—
but rather on whether it captures something important
in relation to the overall research question” (Braun &
Clarke, 2006, p. 82). The search for causal emplotment
in phase 5 identified how the sequence of events were
assembled in a coherent narrative. It analyzed how for
example narratives about the reform of international in-
stitutions and the intensification of intra-BRICS mutually
beneficial cooperation may positively affect the aspira-
Table 1. Qualitative research design for study of strategic narratives.
Research Methodology Pivotal Research Gathering Data Data Data analysis
Design cognitive types structure collection management techniques
modes techniques techniques techniques
Case Study Documentary Reading Textual Structured Documents Coding Thematic
analysis
Narrative
analysis
Table 2. Six phases of the documentary methodology.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Codes Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Strategic
Descriptive coding Thematic Narrative codes
of narrative analysis analysis Constitute themes and
components Step 1: Thematic Step 1: Narrative narrative structures in
coding coding three types of strategic
Step 2: Searching Step 2: Searching narratives
for themes for causal
emplotment
Organizing Tagging and Act (what) 1. Thematic 1. Narrative 1. Constitute themes
the designing a Scene (where and 1. coding 1. coding 1. and narrative
documents coding when) 2. Themes 2. Narratives 1. structures in
in excel files. framework Agent (who) 2. Sub themes 2. and 1. system narrative,
Agency (how, by 2. emplotment 1. identity narrative
Reading and what means) 1. and issue narrative
writing Purpose (why) 2. Create a coherent
down initial 2. report
ideas
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tion for a more fair and democratic multipolar world or-
der. The last phase integrated the results through the
conceptual framework of strategic narratives, which is
disclosed below.
3. BRICS Strategic Narratives
In the BRICS joint communiqués, a system narrative of
global recovery; an identity narrative of inclusive partic-
ipation; and an issue narrative of infrastructural devel-
opment were identified. The themes in each of these
narratives emphasize responsive multilateralism, a cul-
ture of equity and strategic synergies respectively. Under
the premises “that the 21st century should be marked by
peace, security, development, and cooperation” (BRICS,
2013, nº 22), the BRICS group aspires “amore democratic
and just multi-polar world order” (BRICS, 2009, nº 12). In
this part, I will discuss the strategic narratives that I iden-
tified in BRICS joint communiqués.
3.1. Strategic System Narrative of Global Recovery
BRICS strategic system narrative of global recovery ad-
dresses good governance, in particular in the area of fi-
nance, economics and international security and a cen-
tral role for the G20 Summits “in dealing with the finan-
cial crisis” (BRIC, 2009, nº 1). The imagined recuperation
presupposes a revival of economic growth, as well as the
restructuring of multilateral institutions to counter “the
risk of seeing them fade into obsolescence” (BRIC, 2010,
nº 11). A reformed multilateral system should support a
“strong client orientation that recognizes each country’s
development needs” (BRICS, 2014a, nº 19). The princi-
ple of “common but differentiated responsibilities” is an
important element in this narrative (BRICS, 2012, nº 22).
The recovery is not proposing a counter challenge against
existing market capitalism practices. It accommodates
both short-term goals, i.e. the annualmeetings andwork-
shops; as well long-term pursuits, aligned with the sus-
tainable development goals and economic growth exem-
plified in their “roadmap for trade, economic and invest-
ment cooperation until 2020” (BRICS, 2016, nº 36).
The central theme in this system narrative suggests
how multilateralism symbolizes a cornerstone function
for sovereign states. Institutions such as the United Na-
tions are essential to address transnational issues involv-
ing trade and security. Multilateralism is seen compat-
ible with sovereignty, as they “insist that international
law provides tools for achieving international justice,
based on principles of good faith and sovereign equal-
ity” (BRICS, 2015a, nº 6). In their search to make multi-
lateral institutions more accountable and legitimate, the
communiqués encourage honorable behavior. In partic-
ular, they promote responsible macroeconomic policy
and compliancewith official development aid (see BRICS,
2013, nº 7, 2016, nº 22). The BRICS group originates from
a tradition of multilateral dialogues, exemplified by the
repeated citing of the United Nations’ 70th anniversary
(see BRICS, 2014a, 2015a, 2016). Furthermore, the as-
pired global recovery is causally emplotted as to foster
sustainable development and global peace. The BRICS
group is actively engaged with a post-2015 development
agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals adopted
in 2015 (BRICS, 2015a, nº 65). Therefore, a strategic sys-
temnarrative of global recovery imagines responsive and
legitimate multilateral institutions that foster the politi-
cal interests of sovereign states.
3.2. Strategic Identity Narrative of Inclusive
Participation
The joint communiqués strategically communicate an
identity narrative of inclusive participation. The advo-
cacy for more voice and representation communicated
in their system narrative is supported by a narrative ac-
count of their collective identity as responsible, mature,
pro-active emerging powers. These emerging countries
advocate for inclusive participation as a conditional to
re-order international affairs in a sustainable way. The
leitmotifs of the 2014 and 2016 BRICS summits reinforce
this vision of negotiation, i.e. “inclusive growth, sustain-
able solutions” and “building responsiveness, inclusive
and collective solutions” (BRICS, 2014a, 2016). There is a
strong commitment to the G20 on the premises of inclu-
sive participation: “Compared to previous arrangements,
the G-20 is broader, more inclusive, diverse, representa-
tive and effective” (BRIC, 2010, nº 3). The BRICS group
causally emplot an identity narrative of inclusive partici-
pation as mutually constitutive to their system narrative
of global economic recovery.
The central theme identified in this narrative is eq-
uity, which encourages fair play instead of positive affir-
mation. For example, they advocate for the treatment of
“all human rights, including the right to development, in a
fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the
same emphasis” (BRICS, 2014a, nº 30). Competitiveness
is imagined as an outcome of an equitable international
system. Inclusive participation is advocated through rep-
resentative experiences of political leadership. For exam-
ple, the performance of the respective members to host
high profile events is praised: “We commend China for
the successful hosting of the 11th G20 Leaders’ Summit
in Hangzhou” (BRICS, 2016, nº 41) and “We congratulate
Brazil on hosting the UN Conference on Sustainable De-
velopment” (BRICS, 2013, nº 35). The emphasis in this
narrative is on how inclusive decision-making in interna-
tional affairs exemplifies fairness.
3.3. Strategic Issue Narrative of Infrastructural
Development
The issue narrative of infrastructural development is sig-
nificant in the BRICS joint communiqués. It concerns the
mobilization of infrastructure investments and the pro-
motion of physical infrastructure respectively. The narra-
tive of inclusive participation propelled a range of intra-
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 121–129 124
BRICS cooperation schemes, with the New Development
Bank as its flagship. The documents encourage proactive
behavior, “for the development of action-oriented eco-
nomic cooperation and systematic strengthening of eco-
nomic partnership for the recovery of the global econ-
omy” (BRICS, 2015a, nº 12). Cooperation is envisioned
in many issue areas, in which I interpreted infrastructure
financing and development to be the main foci. This is-
sue narrative of infrastructural development empowers
BRICS identity narrative of inclusive participation for that
it provides structural tools that are responsive and eq-
uitable. It also recounts a bottom up approach in which
infrastructural development may translate into an eco-
nomic global recovery. The main theme in this narrative
is feasible and strategic synergies for prosperity. There-
fore, infrastructural development communicates a social
reality defined by synergy in un(der) explored areas of
cooperation. The strategic framework that is envisioned
aims to “strengthen cooperation in science, technology
and innovation with the purposes of promoting inclu-
sive and sustainable social and economic development
[and] providing a new quality of growth based on eco-
nomic complementarity” (BRICS, 2015a, nº 62). The com-
plementary cooperation that is aspired envisions an hon-
est South–South dialogue. It celebrates the expertise in
the country, the possible export of “best practice”, and
the promotion of fruitful enterprises. The issue narrative
of infrastructural development communicates connectiv-
ity between the promotion and financing of institutional,
physical and people-to-people interactions.
4. Compliance Narrative Grammar
To understand whether the BRICS group is expected to
gain support for their mission to foster a fair and demo-
cratic multipolar world order, I have used the “narrative
grammar” for the evaluation of BRICS strategic narratives
(Dimitriu & de Graaf, 2016, p. 7). This part examines
how BRICS strategic narratives articulate a credible sto-
ryworld, juxtaposing the strategic narratives in relation
to a narrative environment of symbolic, institutional and
material practices.
4.1. Mission Purpose
At its essence, it is not well-defined how BRICS the “eco-
nomic story” of five emerging market economies and
BRICS the institutionalized “political story” are mutually
constitutive. The challenge is to interconnect the two sto-
ries: “working from economic reality to a tighter sense
of normative and ideational identity amongst the group-
ing’s membership” (Cooper & Thakur, 2013, p. 274). The
communication of global recovery is fairly unsubstanti-
ated, given that these “emerging powers have produced
neither a unified ideology, nor a new institutional frame-
work for global governance that is politically and ideo-
logically universal” (Xing, 2016, p. 50). Multipolarity can
be classified as the least stable international order (Mur-
ray, 2016, p. 95). It is unclear in the texts how the global
recovery is peaceful and fair in light of the loose con-
tract between sovereign states and their commitment
to multilateralism.
In comparison to BRICS strategic system narrative,
BRICS identity and issue narratives promotemore clearly
how a democratic and equitablemultipolar world should
look like. Advocacy for inclusive participation is projected
as a natural development, considering that their partici-
pation is essential in addressing global challenges (see
for example the Heiligendam process). It particularly
aims to shape a preferred narrative of decision-making
processes. With respect to BRICS issue narrative of in-
frastructural development, this causally connects energy,
telecommunication and transport sectors for the bene-
fit of sustainable development (BRICS, 2016, nº 62). The
establishment of the New Development Bank responds
to the real and persistent gap in infrastructure financing
(BRICS, 2013, nº 9). There is the demand for infrastruc-
ture and commodities, as well as existence of in-house
knowledge, resources and technology (see analyses on
complementary cooperation, for example Mudunuru,
2013, p. 65). TheNewDevelopment Bank exemplifies the
do-it-yourself attitude of the BRICS.
4.2. Legitimacy
The reordering of the world is pursued through legiti-
mate procedures, i.e. reform to address the underrep-
resentation of emerging and developing countries. How-
ever, in the subjective sense it fails to comprehensively
account for the political and cultural divergences be-
tween the five member states. For example, the credibil-
ity of these countries to pursue a democratic world order
is weak, given the (semi) authoritarian regimes of two of
the five BRICS members (Abdenur & Folly, 2015, p. 88).
BRICS system narrative of global recovery does not fully
legitimize their mission of a fair and democratic multipo-
lar world order.
According to the same argument, inclusive participa-
tion has been performed in the procedural sense but
is not entirely attuned to diverging cultural norms and
values. Since 2013, regional leaders have been invited
to attend the BRICS Summits (see BRICS, 2013). How-
ever, the BRICS group advocate for the emerging and
developing countries, without necessarily attaining this
regional leadership position (see the work on Brazil and
South Africa, by Vieira & Alden, 2011). Also, the encour-
agement of intra-BRICS meetings of non-state actors (i.e.
civil society, academic community) articulates a demo-
cratic and fair decision-making processes. Again, in the
subjective sense it does not provide compelling argu-
ments for why these processes are credible open spaces
for narrative contestation of state narratives.
The same is acknowledged in BRICS issue narrative
of infrastructural development narrative. It is procedu-
rally legitimate, given the integration of these countries
in the global economy. Complementary cooperation is
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credible, given that the group includes “the factory of
the world (China), the garden of the world (Brazil), the
gas station of the world (Russia)…, the back office of the
world (India)” and South Africa as the “African Gateway”
(Kahn, 2011a, p 493, 2011b, p. 496). But is does not at-
tend to economic power imbalances, and therefore new
expected emerging economic hierarchies.
4.3. Prospect of Success
BRICS system narrative of global recovery is not clearly
stipulating an overarching storyline that promises suc-
cess. Originally a consultation group on finance and
good governance, the BRICS group expanded its issue
areas. Evidently, this complicates the measuring of suc-
cess given that there are “no tangible policy measures
and specific projects are announced following the talks”
(Liu, 2016, p. 450). It affects the apprehension of the
cooperation, because “without clearly formulated policy
goals at the start, it is quite cumbersome to design them
once the mission is underway” (2016, p. 11). Further-
more, the stunning growth and performance of the initial
decade are difficult to repeat. In particular, “now that the
BRICs story is better known, expectations are higher and
the valuation gap is much smaller” (Wilson, Kelston, &
Ahmed, 2010, p. 1). Also, adverse events (i.e. economic
downturn and political challenges, see Talley, 2016; Tis-
dal, 2016) are not comprehensively emplotted in BRICS
joint communiqués. Therefore, the causal emplotment
of events are not effectively narrated in a success narra-
tive. Correspondingly, “the tectonic plates of global pol-
itics are certainly shifting, but their movements are yet
not predictable” (Pant, 2013, p. 103). A clear roadmap
that addresses BRICS means, ways and ends would im-
prove the political communication.
BRICS identity narrative of inclusive participation
aims to shape both the behavior of international and do-
mestic audiences. It advocates for reform on the global
level, as well as it promotes multi-stakeholdership in
domestic debates. A “horizon of success and progress”
(Dimitriu & de Graaf, 2016, p. 7) is indicative when non-
state actors, i.e. civil society and academics, have mea-
surable participatory influence on narrative contestation
on the national and subsequently the multilateral level.
Commitments for non-state actors’ participation tend to
have a secondary position in the BRICS joint commu-
niques (see numerical order of commitments incorporat-
ing the participation of non-state actors), emphasizing
the prioritized role of sovereign states to contest and con-
stitute narratives of international order.
To judge the promise of success expressed by BRICS
issue narrative of infrastructural development is ar-
guably premature. The establishment of the New Devel-
opment Bank is very recent (see BRICS, 2014b, 2015b),
and the ability to mobilize resources is a matter of time.
However, emphasis on connectivity in the communiqués
is indicative of an aspired political reality that accommo-
dates their infrastructure bottlenecks through the provi-
sion of accommodating solutions (i.e. in contrast to con-
ditioned International Monetary Fund loans). This narra-
tive resonates with BRICS identity narrative of inclusive
participation through its democratic governance and self-
defined policies.
4.4. Presence of Counter Narratives
In terms of the compliance of BRICS strategic narra-
tives with the narrative grammatical rule of presence
or absence of counter narratives, this is largely based
on implicit reading. Paratextual, both academic papers
and news articles signal more explicitly the presence of
counter narratives. Accordingly, the “greater the dissent,
the better the possibility that themedia will start inscrib-
ing these political dissenting voices, that is, counternar-
ratives, into their dichotomous media frames” (Dim-
itriu & de Graaf, 2016, p. 12). BRICS reordering of the
world does not accommodate the asymmetric power
balances between the BRICS countries, i.e. China’s dis-
proportionate political and economic weight. The eco-
nomic downturn undermined the narrative coherence
of BRICS the “economic story”. The reporting on the
closure of Goldman Sachs’ BRICs investment fund per-
petuated this reading (Iosebashvili, 2015). These con-
cerns about BRICS means to pursue global recovery and
China’s disproportionate economic weight perpetuate
counter narratives.
The issue narrative of inclusive participation is a prag-
matic approach to cope with global governance and de-
velopment challenges. In practice, instances of political
discontent were effectively concealed in the commu-
niqués, albeit emphasized in media reports. Russia’s an-
nexation of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine in 2014
forced the powers to conceal their unease about the vi-
olation of the sovereignty principle. Unmistakably refer-
ring to the international isolation of Russia, the joint com-
muniqués denounces “unilateral military interventions
and economic sanctions in violation of international law
and universally recognized norms of international rela-
tions” (BRICS, 2014a, nº 27). Furthermore, news reports
of the Goa Summit highlighted the tension between In-
dia and China on the issue of state-sponsored Pakistani
terrorist groups (Parashari, 2016). At the same meeting,
Russian President Vladimir Putin presumably declined a
private meeting with Brazilian President Michel Temer,
as he disapproved the impeachment of “comrade” Dilma
Rousseff (Escobar, 2016). Inclusive participation should
not come at the expense of sovereign power; therefore
“none of these newly-empowered, rising developing na-
tions will agree to limit their own sovereignty or to allow
supranational bodies” (Fituni, 2014, p. 107). The infor-
mal contract between sovereign states and their commit-
ment to multilateralism therefore evokes a cherry-pick
approach of policy areas that are least prone to be po-
litically sensitive. It signifies that the aspired decision-
making processes surpasses the necessity to agree on all
issue areas.
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Lastly, BRICS issue narrative of infrastructural devel-
opment encounters various counter narratives articu-
lated by non-state actors in the BRICS countries. While
BRICS identity narrative of inclusive participation pro-
moted the participatory role of civil society, this promise
did not promote a new (infrastructural) development
paradigm with a large support. Originally, civil society
supported the BRICS coordination, as it thought to be
a counter hegemonic challenge. What arguably divides
the coherency of this issue narrative, is “that the coali-
tion, and the NDB [New Development Bank] more specif-
ically, are being shaped in ways that favor the interests
and values of the two autocratic members” (Abdenur
& Folly, 2015, p. 88; Kiely, 2016, p. 33). Good gover-
nance and development discriminates the issue narra-
tive therefore in two camps: the “IBSA” countries (Brazil,
India, South Africa) in the one camp, and Russia and
China in the other. Other types of counter narratives orig-
inate in the critique on BRICS endorsement of the neolib-
eral development model (Taylor, 2014), exemplified by
the BRICS-from-Below movement (see the work of Bond
& Garcia, 2015). It assumes an existential incompatibil-
ity between infrastructural development as imagined by
the BRICS group and a desirable fair and just multipolar
world order.
5. In Conclusion
This paper examined how the BRICS group gives mean-
ing to the international system, their collective identity
and the issue of infrastructural development and how
these BRICS strategic narratives relate to a narrative en-
vironment of symbolic, institutional and material prac-
tices. Using a documentary analysis, I identified a sys-
tem narrative of global recovery, an identity narrative of
inclusive participation, and an issue narrative of infras-
tructural development respectively. Due to partial com-
pliance of BRICS strategic narratives with the narrative
grammatical rules, the BRICS group may not effectively
generate public support for their proposed reordering of
the world. The narratives convey procedural legitimacy,
but fail to address a narrative environment of symbolic,
institutional and material practices. Without causal im-
plications of tangible indicators and achieved successes,
BRICS joint communiques fail to communicate a tempo-
ral sequence of events and therefore a (promised) indi-
cation of success. The presence of counter narratives is
arguably negligible. However, the BRICS group as awhole
may lose relevance due to an implicit reading of China’s
asymmetric weight and the choice to not emplot adverse
events such as the economic downturn and political chal-
lenges into a coherent narrative.
The analysis discussed the ontological dimensions
of BRICS strategic narratives. It did not seek to answer
whether the narratives effectively changed domestic
and international behavior. Furthermore, qualitative re-
search on how member states contest BRICS strategic
narratives would demonstrate how the battle of narra-
tives within the BRICS group is effecting the narratives’
coherency and strength. Evidently, this paper is a short-
ened version (full analysis on formation and narrative
contestation on this formation to be included in the au-
thor’s doctoral). For future reference, the mutual con-
stitutive interaction between the visual imagery (Crilley,
2015) of BRICS annual summits (i.e. logo and websites)
and the joint communiqués would improve the ontolog-
ical analysis of BRICS strategic narratives.
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